Lingnan University

Digital Commons @ Lingnan University
staff_fulltext
8-1-2017

Social protection for the informal sector in urban China :
institutional constraints and self-selection behaviour
Jin JIANG
Jiwei QIAN
National University of Singapore

Zhuoyi WEN

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.ln.edu.hk/staff_fulltext

Recommended Citation
JIANG, Jin; QIAN, Jiwei; and WEN, Zhuoyi, "Social protection for the informal sector in urban China :
institutional constraints and self-selection behaviour" (2017). staff_fulltext. 3.
https://commons.ln.edu.hk/staff_fulltext/3

This Journal article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Lingnan University. It has
been accepted for inclusion in staff_fulltext by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Lingnan
University.

Social Protection for the Labour Force of Informal Sector in Urban China: Institutional
Constraints and Self-selection Behaviour
Jin JIANG1, Jiwei QIAN2, Zhuoyi WEN3

1

Division of Graduate Studies, Lingnan University
E-mail: jjiang@LN.edu.hk
2

East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore
E-mail: jiwei.qian@nus.edu.sg
Asia-Pacific Institute of Ageing Studies, Lingnan University
E-mail: wenzhuoyi@msn.com

1

Cite this article as:
Jiang, J., Qian, J., & Wen, Z. (2018). Social protection for the informal sector in urban China:
institutional constraints and self-selection behaviour. Journal of Social Policy, 47(2), 335-357.

Social Protection for the Labour Force of Informal Sector in Urban China: Institutional
Constraints and Self-selection Behaviour1
Jin JIANG, Jiwei QIAN, Zhuoyi WEN

Abstract:
The Chinese government has recently expanded the scope of urban social insurance
programmes. However, social protection for the labour force of urban informal sector, which
reaches about half the number of urban workers, lags significantly behind. This under-coverage
may be due to institutional constraints, particularly the household registration system (hukou),
and self-selection behaviour related to the limited benefits of social insurance. Drawing on a
recent nationwide individual-level survey and city-level statistics, this study examines these
two explanations for the under-enrolment of social insurance programme. First, results suggest
that hukou and the intergovernmental fiscal system are major institutional constraints. Second,
self-selection behaviour in programme enrolment is verified. Employers in the informal sector
are likely to opt out of social insurance. More importantly, employers in the informal sector
with rural or non-local hukou are also likely to opt out of social insurance, which suggests that
self-selection behaviour is constrained by institutions. Such findings have important
implications for broad theoretical and policy debates on universal social protection.
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Introduction
Renewed concern has emerged for the universal coverage of social protection because
of restricted livelihood opportunities and high levels of poverty under globalisation
labour market segmentation (Canagarajah and Sethuraman, 2001; United Nations
Research Institute for Social Development [UNRISD], 2012; International Labour
Organization [ILO], 2014). The recent joint statement on universal social protection
initiative by the World Bank Group and ILO indicated that universal social protection
refers to ‘the integrated set of policies designed to ensure income security and support
to people across the life cycle by paying particular attention to the poor and the
vulnerable’ (ILO, 2015). Therefore, two conditions must be fulfilled for universal
coverage: (1) everyone should enrol in a social programme and (2) sufficient financial
protection must be provided for each enrollee.
Many developed and developing countries adopt social insurance programmes
to secure protection from income insecurity caused by sickness, maternity,
employment injury, unemployment and old age (Kim, 2001; ILO, 2014; Kim, 2016).
The outcomes of the interaction between social insurance and labour market policies
in developed countries have long been heatedly debated. These debates have
highlighted the role of institutional constraints, particularly labour market structure
and policy regulation, in restricting universal access to social protection. For example,
discussions on increasing conditionalities on contribution and work requirement for
social insurance are ongoing (Sjöberg, 1999; Shutes, 2016). Other discussions on
institutional constraints in this context include liberalisation or dualisation of pension
and unemployment policy reforms and their impacts on an insider–outsider social
division (Erlinghagen and Knuth, 2010; Clasen and Goerne, 2011; Bridgen and Meyer,
2014).
China adopts the social insurance approach to protect its citizens. Since the
mid-1980s, the Chinese government has initiated various types of social insurance to
settle the social unrest of millions of laid-off urban workers and facilitate the reform of
state-owned enterprises (Wong and Ngok, 2006; Hu, 2015). However, the social
protection for the labour force of the urban informal sector generally lags significantly
behind in China (Kumar and Li, 2007; Rickne, 2013; Guo, et al., 2016). Following the
literature, the current study defines the informal sector labour force as working people
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with informality in either outside the formal sector enterprises (e.g. urban-registered
private enterprises, most of which are small scaled, or individual businesses), or
employment relation (e.g. without a written contract, flexibly employed or
self-employed).
The number of urban labour force that work outside the formal sector
enterprises has accounted for over half of the total urban labour force in recent years.
Given the large size of this sector, the social protection for its members has a
significant impact over social and economic developments for three reasons. First, it
is important to achieve a universal coverage by protecting people at high risks in
health and employment (Wang et al., 2015). Furthermore, a broad enrolment of social
insurance is pivotal when aging becomes a serious concern in China. Continuous
contribution from a majority of the working age population is crucial for the financial
sustainability of social insurance. The third reason is that, China has highlighted the
economic strategy as an innovation-driven economy in the 13th Five-Year Plan
(2016–2020). A broad coverage of social safety net beyond the urban formal sector
encourages risk-taking innovation, entrepreneurship and the formation of a flexible
labour market (Guo and Wang, 2016).
Compared with the formal sector counterparts, the informal sector labour force
is less likely to enrol in social insurance for two possible reasons. First, the
institutional discrimination of hukou (household registration status) and the
occupation-based welfare regime persist (Ringen and Ngok, 2013). Some informal
sector labours are not fully eligible to enrol for social insurance programmes if they
do not have a local hukou or written labour contract. Second, given the weak
enforcement of labour inspection, the informal labour force (e.g. self-employed and
flexibly employed workers) possesses considerable discretion to determine their
enrolment than those working in the formal sector. Members of the informal labour
force may voluntarily opt out of a social insurance.
Since 2003, the Chinese government has begun to shift its governance priority
to social policy, including the provision of a universal social protection coverage
(Wang, 2008). Two main developments may encourage the labour force of the
informal sector to enrol in social insurance. First, new social programmes have been
initiated to cover social groups that were previously excluded in social insurances. In
3

the 2000s, the government initiated pension schemes and health insurances for urban
and rural residents, flexibly employed, peasants and migrant workers (Gao, et al.,
2013; Giles, et al., 2013; Huang, 2014; Ngok, 2016).
Second, the hukou constraint was relaxed in 2002 in terms of public service
access. One of the signature initiatives in local policy experiments is to grant migrant
workers (workers without local hukou) equal access to social insurance programmes.
Migrant workers who have local residence status and labour contracts can access
social insurance programmes that were previously accessible to local urban workers
only. Accordingly, the insider–outsider boundary is shifting from a rigid urban–rural
division to a within–without criterion (Shi, 2012; Cheng et al., 2014).
Overall, social insurance programmes have been reconfigured to become
further inclusive and universal; however, questions exist regarding these two recent
moves in achieving universal coverage. Hukou and occupation-based elements may
remain pervasive after the expansion of social protection because social insurance is
managed by the local government, and most social benefits are not portable across
cities and regions (Ringen and Ngok, 2013).
The current research investigates the determinants of enrolment in social
insurance for the informal sector labour force in urban China in light of the preceding
discussion. This study draws on the nationally representative survey data collected in
2012, and determines that the labour force of the informal sector has significant
disadvantages in social protection. The non-local and rural hukou and the
intergovernmental fiscal system are major institutional constraints in achieving a
universal coverage of social protection. The present study suggests that the informal
sector workers who have urban and local hukou and reside in a city with large fiscal
capacity are likely to enrol in social insurances. Also, employers of the urban informal
sector, who have more discretion than employees over their enrolment status, are
likely to self-select to opt out of social insurances. In addition, the self-selection
behaviour is constrained by institutions, such as hukou. Employers in the urban
informal sector without local or urban hukou are likely to opt out of social insurances
than those with hukou.
The contributions of this research are threefold. First, this study provides a
comprehensive view of social insurance coverage based on nationally representative
4

individual- and city-level data. Furthermore, this study is the first thorough
investigation of the disadvantages of the informal sector labour force in social
protection in urban China. Institutional constraints and self-selection behaviour are
highlighted as reasons for the undercoverage of social programmes for the labour
force of the urban informal sector. Last but not least, this research reveals the
interaction between self-selection behaviour and institutional constraints. The
integrative explanation of institutional arrangement and individual behaviour provides
new insights into the understanding of the undercoverage of social protection for the
informal sector labour force.

Informal Sector Labour Force and Fragmented Social Insurance in
China
The definition of informal sector is extensively discussed in the literature. ILO has
adopted the concept of informal sector as one that describes the profit-making
activities that are ‘small in scale and limited by simple technologies, little capital and
lack of links with the other sector’ (Bangasser, 2000). In 2003, the 17th International
Conference of Labour Statisticians endorsed to complement the enterprise-based
definition of informal sector with an extensive, labour-based concept of informal
employment. ILO supported the measurement adjustment to include both
‘employment in the informal sector’ and ‘informal employment’ as the informal
sector (Hussmanns, 2004).
The current research follows the literature to include two non-exclusive groups
as the labour force of the urban informal sector. The first group is defined by the
registration status of enterprises. The urban informal sector includes registered private
enterprises and individual businesses. In China, the majority of private enterprises are
small-scale. The average number of employees in a private enterprise in 2013 was
approximately 10.4 (National Bureau of Statistics [NBS], 2013). A nationwide survey
indicated that only 1.1% of private enterprises had over 100 employees in 2005 (Huang,
2013). In this context, private enterprises are generally considered the informal sector
in the literature (Ghose, 2005; Hu and Zhao, 2006). The second group is defined by the
type of employment relation. Individuals without a written employment contract are
categorised under informal employment (Ghose, 2005; Kumar and Li, 2007; Park and
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Cai, 2011). The informal sector labour force for both groups can be employees or (self)
employers.
The current fragmented social insurance regime in China exacerbates the
undercoverage of the informal sector labour force. The fragmentation has two
dimensions, namely, rural–urban/regional division and occupation-based programmes
(Ngok, 2016). The first type of fragmentation is based on the hukou status and locality.
Chinese people under the hukou system are divided into two categories, namely, rural
and urban residents. Hukou also divides people based on their residence location.
Significant differences are identified between rural and urban residents, as well as
amongst residents across different regions, in terms of the scope, coverage and benefit
levels of social insurance programmes (Gao, et al., 2013; Ngok, 2016).
The second fragmentation type is based on occupations and employment sectors.
Public servants and urban workers belong to different social insurance programmes
(Ringen and Ngok, 2013; Ngok, 2016). In recent years, new programmes that target
local residents without formal employment have been initiated in several
metropolises.1 This two-dimensional fragmentation currently makes interregional and
cross-category transfers nearly impossible. These institutional settings decrease the
effectiveness of risk pooling and financial protection.
Against the institutional context, the loose enforcement of labour inspection
causes the enrolment of social insurance programmes for the urban informal sector to
be generally dependent on the decision of employers and employees. In the current
research, ‘employers’ in the informal sector refer to the self-employed and small
business owners. Employers can decide on their own whether to enrol in social
insurance programmes. ‘Employees’ in the informal sector include workers with
informal employment and workers hired by small businesses. For employees,
enrolment in social insurance requires contributions paid by employers and employees
in proportion to their payrolls and wages. Table 1 summarises the contribution rates to
each social insurance programme. Contribution and benefit varies across social
insurances. Regarding to those urban basic employee programmes, the contributions
are proportional to payroll and wage of individuals. The benefits (except for the
pension programme) are not contribution-related and often based on the economic
conditions of a particular city. In terms of the pension and health insurance for urban
6

residents (not the case for another three insurances), the contributions and benefits are
in a lump sum decided by the local government.
--- Table 1 approximately here --The decision of employers in the informal sector on whether to contribute to the
social insurance account of their employees can have an impact on the enrolment
status of the latter (Guo et al., 2016). Although employers in the informal sector can
opt not to contribute to their employees’ accounts in pension or health insurance plans,
the latter can constantly register for urban resident plans for pension and health
insurance, for which the contribution from the former is unnecessary. Hence,
employers and employees in the informal sector can make enrolment decisions.
Nevertheless, employers in the informal sector have more substantial discretion for
their enrolment in social insurance than employees.

Institutional Constraints and Self-selection Behaviour
The enrolment of social programmes is the result of interaction between institutions
and actors. Studies on labour market segmentation and social protection for the labour
force of the informal sector (van Ginneken, 1999; Pellissery and Walker, 2007;
Shaefer, 2010) have identified the following main pervasive factors that contribute to
inadequate coverage:
(1) Government’s institutional settings: extent of the benefits, institutional
restrictions on enrolment eligibility, and administrative barriers on
re-enrolment and portability of social benefits.
(2) Employers and employees’ resistance: low financial and policy literacy,
distrust in public institutions and insurance programmes, unattractive
programme design and additional financial costs.
The current study suggests that institutional constraints and self-selection are
crucial determinants of enrolment in social insurance programmes by the labour force
of the urban informal sector. Institutional constraints in this study refer to specific
rules, procedures and practices that are treated as given for individuals who create
patterned behaviour and interactions (Lowndes and Roerts, 2013). Hukou is a major
7

institutional constraint for programme enrolment in China. The labour market in
China is dichotomised between rural and urban areas, as well as varies across regions.
Rural and non-local hukou may be institutional barriers that create higher enrolment
costs of social insurance programmes for the informal sector labour force than those
created by local urban hukou. For example, the unemployment insurance benefits in
Beijing can only be claimed from the place where the hukou of the beneficiary is
registered. Accordingly, claiming benefits is difficult for those whose hukou is not
registered in Beijing.2 Thus, the informal sector workers with rural and non-local
hukou are unlikely to enrol in social insurance programmes. In 2014, only 16.4% of
rural migrant workers contributed to a basic pension scheme; 18.2% and 9.8%
registered for health and unemployment insurances, respectively (NBS, 2015). These
figures are significantly below the average in urban China.
Hukou has been discussed as an institutional constraint for social insurance
participation in several empirical studies. Moreover, various studies based on
city-level survey and national panel data showed that the members of the informal
sector labour force who are employed by private enterprises or who are self-employed,
particularly migrant workers without local hukou, are unlikely to be covered by
employment-based social insurance programmes in urban China (Gao et al., 2012;
Park et al., 2012; Chen and Gallagher, 2013; Giles et al., 2013; Gao and Rickne, 2015).
These findings are consistent with those of other similar household surveys in Shanghai
(Nyland et al., 2006) and Jiangsu Province (Nielsen et al., 2005).
The intergovernmental fiscal system which determines the local fiscal capacity
is another major institutional constraint. Sufficient local fiscal capacity is pivotal to
expand the coverage and improve the benefits of social insurance. From 2003 to 2009,
the coverage for rural residents under the New Rural Cooperative Health Scheme
increased from 13% to 94% because of government subsidies that accounted for nearly
90% of contributions (Barber and Yao, 2010). The majority share of government
subsidy has been financed by the local government. For example, the local government
provided approximately 56% of subsidy for urban resident health insurance in 20123.
However, the current intergovernmental fiscal system mandates that major tax
revenue is assigned to the central government, whereas responsibilities for financing
and providing public services have been delegated to the local government (Wong and
Bird, 2008). In 2015, the local government accounted for over 86% of the total
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government expenditure but approximately 54% of the total government revenue4. In
this context, local governments with limited fiscal capacity may provide social
insurance only for residents with local and urban hukou, and may lack strong
incentives to implement universal coverage and improve the benefit level. This
situation is the spatial injustice outcome of territorial fragmentation which localises
and regionalises social protection (Shi, 2012; Ngok, 2016).
Self-selection in the current study refers to the purposeful actions of people in
response to a state policy. The self-selection behaviour of the informal sector labour
force for social insurance enrolment is based on the assumption of self-interest of
individuals and their rational analysis of risks, costs and benefits (Rueda, 2005;
Blekesaune, 2007). A few members of the urban informal sector may opt to forego
enrolling in social programmes if the benefits are trivial.
Employers in the informal sector are likely to forego enrolling with social
insurance; they have considerable discretion over their own enrolment status. The
regressive effect of social insurance (Liu et al., 2015) and limited portability of social
benefits under the decentralised and regionalised social insurance (Shi, 2012) may
discourage the informal sector employers from enrolling in social insurance in two
aspects. First, if informal sector employers believe that the benefit of social insurance
programmes is not good enough, they are more likely to opt out compared to
employees. Second, informal sector employers who lack a local or urban hukou are
likely to opt out of social insurance programmes because they are unlikely to enjoy
the benefit of social insurance.
In short, the labour force of the urban informal sector is refrained from enrolling
in social insurance by institutional constraints (e.g. hukou). The labour force of the
informal sector, particularly employers, may also opt out of social insurance
programmes if the financial benefits of the social insurance are insufficient.
Employers with rural or non-local hukou are even more likely to opt out of social
insurance programmes compared to other employers.
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Methods
Data
This study draws on individual- and city-level data. Individual-level data are sourced
from the China Labour-force Dynamics Survey (CLDS) 2012, a nationally
representative household survey conducted by Sun Yat-sen University, China. 5
CLDS 2012 focused on the labour dynamics in China and included the detailed
information of individuals related to the labour market. CLDS respondents were
labourers aged 15 to 64 and selected from the 29 provinces of Mainland China,
excluding Tibet and Hainan (see details on the CLDS 2012 in the Appendix).
The analysis is restricted to a sample of urban individuals who are engaged in
non-farming work. A total of 3,160 individuals from 57 city-level units are extracted
from CLDS 2012. Individual-level data are merged with contextual data for 57
city-level units in 2011. The data are drawn from the China Premium Database6
which provides city-level statistics.
The combined data sets have three main advantages when analysing social
insurance for the labour force of the informal sector. To start with, the data set that
comprises the official statistics of 57 cities and individual-level observations in China
considers regional variations. Prior studies suggested substantial regional variations in
social insurance enrolment. For example, the coverage rate of health insurance for all
individuals aged 16 to 60 in Shanghai (89%) is more than twice the rate in Wuhan
(39%) (Giles et al., 2006, 2013). CLDS 2012 with city-level statistics prompted the
critical analysis of the national development of social insurance programmes whilst
considering the city-level variations. Large variations in the contextual variables
across cities provide adequate statistical power to analyse the influence of city-level
characteristics on the programme enrolment of individuals.
In addition, the CLDS data set included a large number of observations of
migrant workers which are crucial for analysing the social protection for the urban
labour force. China has witnessed a significant increase in the number of migrant
workers with the rural hukou working in urban areas. However, the inclusion of
migrant workers in household surveys is a challenge because they cannot be identified
in official registrations (Gustafsson et al., 2014). The current study draws on an
10

inclusive sample from CLDS 2012 with migrants and non-migrants, as well as
provides accurate estimations of the social protection for the entire labour force of the
informal sector.
Last but not least, the data reflect the updated policy outcomes amidst social
protection expansion. In the era of social reform, the Labour Contract Law and Social
Insurance Law were implemented in 2008 and 2011, respectively. CLDS 2012
precisely covered the social protection expansion and the enactment of policy
regulation in China since 2003 (Shi, 2012; Gao et al., 2013; Ringen and Ngok, 2013;
Huang, 2014).
Measures
The dependent variables are enrolments in three types of social insurance programmes:
(1) basic employee/resident pension schemes, (2) urban employee/resident basic
health insurance and (3) other types of social insurance, including unemployment,
work-related injury and maternity insurance. To avoid underestimating the social
insurance coverage in urban areas, the enrolment status is considered positive if
individuals enrol with any social insurance programmes for urban workers or
residents. Data analysis also includes the enrolment status of private commercial
pension and health insurance as dependent variables for robustness check.
Informal Sector Employment (formal = 0) refers to people who work in private
enterprises and individual businesses, as well as individuals under informal
employment (i.e. working without a written contract or flexibly employed). (See
details in the Appendix).
Institutional constraints are measured as the hukou status of individuals and
fiscal revenue per capita of a city. The hukou status is classified into urban/rural and
local/non-local. The city-level fiscal revenue is measured in per capita of 2011 and in
RMB 1,000 (approximately USD 145). The fiscal revenue and other city-level
controls are measured in their lagged value to avoid endogeneity problem in
regression analysis (i.e. 2011 statistics).
Self-selection behaviour is measured by employment status. Employers in the
informal sector have considerable discretion over their own enrolment status. If
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employers are likely to opt out or enrol in social insurance programmes, then the
finding implies the self-selection behaviour of employers.
Individual-level characteristics are controlled, including three dummy
variables (i.e. gender (male = 0), work status (employed = 0) and employment status
(employee = 0)) and three continuous variables (i.e. education (years of schooling),
age and income). The income variable is considered in the logarithm.
City-level contextual measures are also included as controls, including gross
domestic product (GDP) per capita, social security and employment expenditure and
government health expenditure for 2011; these measures are measured in per capita.
Social security and employment expenditure includes government expenditure under
the Minimum Livelihood Guarantee Scheme (Dibao), as well as basic social
assistance government expenditures on social security subsidies and expenditures for
retired government employees. Social security and employment expenditures cover
programme benefits. These benefits mainly target people who are not working in the
formal sector, such as retirees and beneficiaries of social assistance programmes.
Social security and employment expenditure per capita is a relevant variable because
the benefit of social assistance programmes may affect the enrolment rate of social
insurance types. For example, medical assistance is a social assistance programme
that provides financial coverage for the health care of the urban poor. Similarly, the
Dibao programme provides financial coverage for the urban poor who may be
unemployed as well. A few urban workers in the informal sector may want to claim
benefits from social assistance and not enrol in social insurance, such as
unemployment or health insurance types. Thus, the enrolment rate of social insurance
may be decreased if the benefit level of social assistance is sufficiently high (Qian and
Mok 2016).
Moreover, the enrolment rate is affected by the benefit level of social
insurance; such benefit level is increased with local social expenditure. The official
number of city-level government budget allocated for social insurance is unavailable.
Thus, government health expenditure is used as a proxy to measure the benefit of
social insurance.

12

Analytic Strategy
A multilevel mixed-effect binary logistic regression model is employed to analyse the
data. The first set of analyses evaluates the advantages of the informal sector labour
force in terms of enrolment in social insurance programmes. Individual-level control
variables include gender, employment status, education, age and income. The vectors
of city-level variables, including GDP per capita, fiscal revenue per capita, social
security and employment expenditure per capita and government health expenditure
per capita, are also controlled.
The second set of analyses focuses on the labour force of the urban informal
sector and analyses the determinants of their programme enrolments. The effects of
the two types of hukou status (i.e. basic control and city-level contextual variables) are
analysed.

Results
Descriptive Statistics
In the analysis sample of 3,160 individuals, 2,067 are the informal sector labour force,
thereby accounting for 65.4% of the total working sample (see Table A1 in the
Appendix for the descriptive statistics of the individual variables). On the basis of the
registration status of enterprises, a few scholars used data in statistical yearbooks to
estimate that the share of the urban informal sector workers was 56.8% in 2002
(Ghose, 2005, p. 27) and 58.7% by 2004 (Hu and Zhao, 2006). In the sample of the
current study, the number of workers in the informal sector enterprises is 1,635 (51.7%
of the total observations in 2012) which is consistent with the yearbook data cited in
the literature. However, the definition of the informal sector in the present study is
broader than that in the yearbook because the former also includes workers under
informal employment (i.e. without a formal labour contract) but working in the formal
sector enterprises7. The percentage of informal employment in the formal sector in
2012 is 13.7% of the analysis sample (see Table A2 in the Appendix). This ratio is
also consistent with findings in other studies. Xue and Gao (2012) estimated that
informal employment in the formal sector accounted for approximately 11.1% of the
13

total urban labour force based on the 2005 China One Percent Population Sample
Survey, which was conducted by National Bureau of Statistics. The relatively high
proportion of the informal labour force reported in the current study is therefore
conceivable because the informal employment in the formal sector is also included.
The descriptive statistics also shows that enrolment in social insurance
programmes is not universal. The figures in Table 2 suggest that the enrolment rate of
the formal labour force ranges from 78% to 95% which is nearly twice that of the
labour force of the informal sector. The labour force of the informal sector comprises
the employees and employers (including self-employed and small business owners).
In our sample, over 70% of the employers are reported as self-employed (see Figure
A1 in the Appendix for details). For the informal labour sector, the programme
enrolment rates of employers are lower than those of employees. Table A3
summarises the descriptive statistics of the contextual variables for the 57 city-level
divisions (see Appendix).
--- Table 2 approximately here ---

Disadvantage of the Informal Sector in the Programme Enrolments
Table 3 presents the results of the mixed-effect logistic regression models that predict
the likelihood of enrolment in three types of social insurance programmes, namely,
pension, health insurance and other social insurance programmes. The differences
between the labour force of the formal and informal sectors are compared in terms of
their accessibility to the three types of social insurance programmes which are
conditional on the individual- and city-level characteristics. The results reported in
Table 3 suggest that the social protection of the informal sector labour force is less
than that of the formal sector labour force. For the labour force of the formal and
informal sectors, the rural hukou, non-local hukou, fiscal capacity, income and
education are positively correlated with the likelihood of programme enrolment.
--- Table 3 approximately here ---
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Determinants of Programme Enrolment: Institutional Constraints
Table 4 shows the estimated multilevel mixed-effect logistic regression models that
predict the probability of insurance programme enrolment for the labour force of the
informal sector. The results reveal that the rural and non-local hukou statuses are
significant institutional constraints to achieve the universal coverage of social
insurance, particularly for enrolment in Models 1, 2 and 3. The findings support the
argument that the labour force of the informal sector with non-local and rural hukou is
less likely to enrol in social insurance programmes. The significance of the
urban/rural hukou and local/non-local hukou differs across programmes. Rural hukou
is a larger constraint than non-local hukou in health insurance enrolment which
includes urban employee and resident health insurance.
City fiscal revenue has positive and significant effects on enrolment in social
health insurance and basic pension schemes (i.e. Models 1 and 2). Thus,
intergovernmental fiscal system which defines local fiscal capacity is another critical
institutional constraint. These results suggest that the labour force of the informal
sector in a city with large fiscal capacity is likely to enrol in social programmes.
Social security and employment expenditure is negatively associated with the
enrolment rate of pension and social health insurance but is insignificant.
--- Table 4 approximately here ---

Determinants of Programme Enrolment: Self-selection
The results reveal the self-selection behaviour in programme enrolment. Employers
often have discretionary power to decide their programme enrolment. They are likely to
self-select to enrol in programmes. Table 4 shows that employers in the informal
sector are more likely to opt out of social insurance programmes than employees do
(i.e. Models 1, 2 and 3). However, employers are more likely to purchase private
commercial pension and health insurance (i.e. Models 4 and 5). The results suggest
that the benefits of social insurance programmes may not be attractive to employers in
the informal sector. Rather, employers will opt for private commercial programmes.
Income is positively and statistically significant in Model 3. The income effect
is positive in ‘other’ insurance reported in Model 3 because the amount of
15

contribution for employees is not income related for maternity and injury insurance
(see Table 1). In this case, high-income workers may be more likely to afford to enrol
in ‘other insurance’ than low-income workers may. By contrast, income is statistically
insignificant in Model 1 and only marginally significant in Model 2. For basic
employee pension and health insurance, the contribution is income-related particularly
for employees. High-income workers may lack a strong incentive to enrol because
they need to contribute substantially.

Determinants of Programme Enrolment: Interaction between Institutional
Constraints and Self-selection
The self-selection behaviour of employers in the informal sector is constrained by
institutions, such as hukou. Table 5 shows the effects of institutional constraints on
employers in the informal sector. Compared with the informal sector employers with
urban/local hukou, employers with rural/non-local hukou in the informal sector are
less likely to enrol in pension and health insurance programmes (i.e. Models 1 and 2
in Table 5). The findings suggest that the degree of self-selection is affected by the
hukou constraints. Employers with rural or non-local hukou in the informal sector are
likely to opt out of social programmes because the benefits of these programmes are
often non-transferable across cities or from urban to rural areas. Accordingly, the
institutional constraints from hukou magnify this self-selection effect. Fiscal revenue
remains to be a significant determinant of programme enrolment in the analysis in
Table 5, thereby suggesting that governments with strong fiscal capacity may be able
to provide good social benefits that are attractive to employers in the informal sector.
Table 5 shows that the coefficient of income is insignificant. That is, no
significant difference is obtained in enrolment decision amongst employers with
different income levels. High-income employers may want to enrol with the urban
resident pension and health insurance, in which the amount of contribution is not
income-related. In this case, the income effect is insignificant because the resident and
basic employee insurances are considered social insurance in the current research.
Amongst the employers in the data sample, 138 are enrolled with urban resident
health insurance, whereas only 71 are enrolled with basic urban employee health
insurance.
16

--- Table 5 approximately here ---

Discussion and Conclusion
This research comprehensively analyses the participation of the urban informal sector
labour force in all social insurance programmes after the proactive expansion of social
protection in the past decade in China. This study uses the nationally representative
household survey and city-level statistics as bases to reveal that the labour force of the
informal sector remains significantly disadvantaged in social insurance participation,
and the social protection in urban China remains has yet to become universal.
This research empirically proves that institutional constraints, self-selection
behaviour and their interactive effects are the main determinants for the
undercoverage of social protection of the informal sector labour force in urban China.
The effects of self-selection and institutional constraints of hukou on social insurance
can be supported by a recent report from official media. Migrant workers who are
mainly subject to the institutional constraint of hukou are more likely to ‘voluntarily’
undercontribute to social insurance programmes than other urban labour forces.8
The labour force of the informal sector is subject to certain institutional
constraints (e.g. hukou status and intergovernmental fiscal system) that determine the
fiscal capacity of the city of residence. Workers who have urban and local hukou and
reside in a city with large fiscal capacity are likely to enrol in social insurances. Urban
and local hukou statuses remain significant determinants of social insurance
enrolment in urban China, even within the informal sector, where the
occupation-based welfare system is at its weakest. The findings on institutional
constraints suggest that the resource distribution function of the hukou system
prevails.
Self-selection behaviour is another significant determinant of social insurance
enrolment. Employers of the urban informal sector have more substantial
discretionary power than employees in deciding on their enrolment in social insurance
programmes. Compared to employees, these employers are more unlikely to enrol in
social insurance. Instead, they are more likely to enrol in private commercial
insurance programmes compared to employees.
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In addition, the self-selection behaviour varies based on the hukou status.
Employers without urban/local hukou are more likely to opt out of social programmes
than those with urban/local hukou. That is, the former may expect that the benefit
levels of social insurance programmes are limited for people without urban/local
hukou. Self-selection in the income dimension may not be completely ruled out,
although the enrolment status of employers does not vary significantly with income
level. High-income employers in the informal sector are likely to opt out of the basic
employee insurance and instead enrol with the urban resident social insurance, under
which the amount of contributions is fixed and not income related.
The results are substantially consistent across the pension and health insurance
programmes which are two key social insurance programmes with similar
contribution and benefit structure. By contrast, the results are slightly different for the
‘other’ insurance (i.e. unemployment, work injury and maternity). First, the effect of
institutional constraints is not as strong for ‘other’ insurance as that for pension and
health insurance programmes. A substantially smaller amount of government subsidy
has been allocated to ‘other’ insurance compared to the cases of pension or health
insurance. For example, the government subsidy for ‘other’ insurances in 2013 merely
amounted to approximately 0.3% and 0.4% of the subsidy for pension and health
insurance respectively9. In this case, local fiscal capacity is much less relevant for
‘other’ insurance than pension/health insurance. Second, the self-selection effect is
higher for ‘other’ social insurances than pension and health insurance programmes.
The differences could be due to the different regulatory requirements of the insurance
enrolment. The Social Insurance Law states that the insurances of unemployment,
work injury and maternity (these three insurances are defined as ‘other insurance’ in
this study) are only compulsory for workers with written labour contract.
This research is embedded in a broad literature that discusses the institutional
constraints to social protection, including labour market structure and policy
regulation. The research contribution to the literature is threefold. First, this research
pioneers in presenting the degree of and reason for the under-enrolment in social
insurance of the labour force in the urban informal sector. Although social protection
becomes further inclusive, integrated, generous and progressive in certain
administrative jurisdictions (Shi, 2012; Gao et al., 2013), the current research shows
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that the divisions of social insurance in regions and hukou status remain persistent and
nationwide.
Second, this research contributes to the literature on the political and economic
dynamics of the current programme design (Wong et al., 2007; Huang, 2014, 2015;
Liu et al., 2015). Moreover, the current study provides micro-level evidence of the
self-selection behaviour of employers in the informal sector who opt out of the social
programmes because of insufficient benefit level. These findings in China are not
unique. Similar self-selection behaviour had been observed in other developing
countries, such as Latin American countries (Berens, 2015).
Third, the present research reveals that the undercoverage of social insurance
programmes for the informal sector labour force is a result of the interplay between
institutional constraints and selection behaviour. This finding contributes in
understanding the effect of the interplay of enrolment eligibility rules, benefit levels
and individual conditions on the participation in social insurance. For example, this
research implies that the interaction between self-selection and hukou status can
explain why the social insurance enrolment rate of urban migrants is higher than that
of rural migrants. By contrast, Cheng et al. (2014) emphasised on the role of human
resource management of performance reward and labour retention. The present
research also provides a concrete case of the interaction between actors and
institutions in social policy (UNRISD, 2012; Lowndes and Roberts, 2013). Another
concern on self-selection in programme enrolment is that people may opt to enter the
informal sector or migrate to a particular city with high benefits from social insurance
before they consider opting out of social insurance programmes. For example, an
increasing number of skilled workers opt to work in the informal sector in developed
regions to enjoy high wages, considerable autonomy and dignity (Huang, 2012). With
these additional selections on locations and sectors, the real magnitude of the
self-selection effect on programme enrolment may be even larger than the current
estimation.
The findings on the effects of hukou and local fiscal capacity on the universal
coverage of the informal sector labour force imply that the fragmented social
insurance regimes in China have significant effects on the urban–rural and spatial
fragmentations based on the hukou system and territorial inequality of economic
19

development, respectively (Shi, 2012; Ngok, 2016). These findings also suggest that
institutional constraints, such as the fragmentation of governance (e.g. hukou in China)
and intergovernmental fiscal system (e.g. the fiscal capacity of a city), are generally
crucial to achieve a universal coverage of social programmes in developing countries.
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Notes
1

For example, people under informal employment in Guangzhou could join one of the
health insurance programmes for urban workers or residents (Southern Metropolis
Daily, June 9, 2015).

2

Unemployment insurance balance amounted to RMB 300 billion (Shiye baoxian
jieyu sanqianyi at http://news.sina.com.cn/newobserv/sybx/, accessed on July 20,
2016).

3

The central government provided RMB 20 billion out of RMB 46.9 billion as
subsidy for urban resident health insurance according to
http://sbs.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/gongzuodongtai/201302/t20130228_739589.ht
ml, accessed on March 27, 2017.

4

Budget Report 2015, Ministry of Finance at http://yss.mof.gov.cn/2015czys/,
accessed on July 20, 2016.

5

See the official webpage of the database at http://css.sysu.edu.cn/Data. The data set
has been extensively applied to investigate the social and economic conditions of
the labour force in China (e.g. Xie and Zhou, 2014; Zhang, et al., 2015).

6

See the official webpage of the database at https://www.ceicdata.com/en/countrie
s/china.

7

Workers under informal employment but working in the formal sector enterprises
are considered as formal sector workers in statistical yearbooks. See the definition
of ‘Employed Staff and Workers’ in the China Statistical Yearbook 2016,
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2016/html/zbe04.htm, accessed on March 16,
2017.

8

A report by the Hainan provincial government, Social Security Bureau has similar
observations,
November
18,
2016,
http://www.hi.si.gov.cn/sbxwzxsbxw/20161118/20632.html,
accessed
on
November 30, 2016.

9

In 2013, the government subsidy for pension and health insurance reached RMB
408.3 and 308.2 billion, respectively. For the other three social insurances, the total
government
subsidy
was
merely
RMB
1.3
billion.
See
http://sbs.mof.gov.cn/zhengwuxinxi/gongzuodongtai/201305/t20130507_858298.ht
ml , accessed on March 26, 2017.
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Table 1 Rates of contributions to social insurance programmes in urban China, 2012
Programme

Whether the benefit is
proportional to contribution

Contribution

Insurance programmes for employees
Employer
(payroll)
Basic pension

Employee
(monthly wage)

≤ 20%

≤ 8%



Basic health

6%

2%

1

Unemployment2

2%

1%



Work injury

1%

0



Maternity

≤ 1%

0



Total

≤ 30%

≤ 13%

Insurance programmes for residents3
Resident
Pension

Annual lump sum

4

Health

Annual lump sum



Sources: Adapted from Giles, et al., 2013.
Note:
1. The benefit of social pooling account is not contribution related. But
reimbursement from individual account is contribution related.
2. Since 2015, the contribution rate of unemployment insurance for employers has
decreased
from
3%
to
2%.
See
http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2015-03/04/c_1114523421.htm, accessed July 21,
2016.
3. Both the contributions and benefits of resident insurance programmes are in a lump
sum decided by local government.
4. Only those residents making a 15-years of contribution are entitled to claim pension
benefit.
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Table 2 Enrolment rates of different groups in social insurance programmes (in
percentage)
Urban Labour Force (N=3,160)

Pension
Programme

Health
Programme

Other Types of
Social Insurance

Formal sector workers (N = 1,093)

90.29

94.84

77.73

Informal sector workers (N = 2,067)

46.66

57.71

28.13

Employers (N = 531)

33.60

41.22

6.81

Employees (N = 1,536)

51.66

64.03

36.30

Note: Sampling weights from CLDS 2012 are applied on the enrolment rates.
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Table 3 Disadvantages of informal sector in programme enrolment, mixed-effects
logistic regression models, random effects clustered at city levels

Informal sector
(yes = 1)
Individual-level Characteristics
Rural hukou
(yes = 1)
Non-local hukou
(yes = 1)
Income
Education
(years of schooling)
Age
Gender
(female = 1)
City-level Characteristics in 2011
Fiscal revenue
Social security and employment
expenditure
Health expenditure
GDP per capita
Intercept
Random Effects
Intercept

Pension
Programme
(1)
-1.633***
(0.126)

Health
Programme
(2)
-1.916***
(0.172)

Other Social
Insurances
(3)
-1.820***
(0.103)

-1.387***
(0.131)
-0.696***
(0.138)
0.023***
(0.006)
0.086***
(0.016)
0.036***
(0.005)
0.217*
(0.097)

-1.812***
(0.139)
-0.605***
(0.151)
0.038***
(0.007)
0.167***
(0.018)
0.034***
(0.006)
0.058
(0.111)

-0.640***
(0.138)
-0.381**
(0.139)
0.067***
(0.007)
0.069***
(0.015)
-0.023***
(0.005)
-0.260**
(0.091)

0.108
(0.071)
-0.370
(0.363)
0.048
(0.576)
0.012
(0.009)
-1.077*
(0.510)

0.163*
(0.076)
-0.552
(0.379)
0.773
(0.599)
0.001
(0.009)
-0.777
(0.558)

0.048
(0.060)
-0.254
(0.310)
0.947+
(0.494)
0.012
(0.008)
-0.044
(0.457)

-0.474***
(0.143)

-0.471**
(0.153)

-0.674***
(0.152)

Wald chi-square
603.48***
638.21***
630.92***
statistics (df)
(11)
(11)
(11)
Likelihood ratio tests:
74.95***
52.01***
53.57***
comparison to one-level model
Observations: 3,160 cases in individual level, 57 groups in city level
Note: The city-level characteristics in 2011 (i.e. GDP per capita, fiscal revenue, social
security and employment expenditure, and (government) health expenditure) are determined
per capita and in RMB 1,000. Income was transformed by adding 0.001 and taken the
logarithm because the original variable includes zero with a skewness of 3.8. “Other types of
social insurance” include work injury, maternity, and unemployment insurance programmes.
Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p < 0.1.
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Table 4 Determinants of programme enrolment for informal sector workers,
mixed-effects logistic regression models, random effects clustered at city levels
Social Insurance Programme
Pension
(1)

Health
(2)

Other types
(3)

Private Commercial
Insurance Programme
Pension
Health
(4)
(5)

Institutional Constraints
Rural hukou
-1.323*** -1.638*** -0.579*** -0.630*
-0.342
(yes = 1)
(0.146)
(0.149)
(0.162)
(0.269)
(0.216)
Non-local hukou
-0.739*** -0.548*** -0.423**
-0.082
-0.232
(yes = 1)
(0.155)
(0.161)
(0.162)
(0.252)
(0.211)
0.163*
0.066
0.236*
0.104
Fiscal revenue of a city in 0.162*
2011
(0.070)
(0.079)
(0.067)
(0.103)
(0.086)
Self-selection Behaviour
Employer
-0.353*
-0.412*
-1.263*** 0.790**
0.704**
(yes = 1)
(0.172)
(0.179)
(0.206)
(0.269)
(0.223)
Individual-level Controls
Income
0.010
0.018+
0.035*** -0.026+
-0.018
(0.009)
(0.009)
(0.010)
(0.014)
(0.012)
Education
0.098*** 0.154*** 0.101*** 0.051
0.088***
(years of schooling)
(0.018)
(0.020)
(0.019)
(0.032)
(0.026)
Age
0.035*** 0.030*** -0.018**
-0.018+
-0.008
(0.006)
(0.007)
(0.006)
(0.011)
(0.009)
Gender
0.249*
0.068
-0.261*
0.154
0.103
(female = 1)
(0.111)
(0.120)
(0.111)
(0.186)
(0.150)
0.359**
0.732*** 0.018
0.235
0.183
Formal sector experience
(yes = 1)
(0.126)
(0.139)
(0.130)
(0.215)
(0.175)
City-level Control in 2011
-0.542
-0.645
-0.531
-0.038
0.404
Social security and
employment expenditure (0.351)
(0.393)
(0.347)
(0.535)
(0.464)
Health expenditure
0.262
0.920
0.980+
-0.777
0.114
(0.550)
(0.617)
(0.537)
(0.965)
(0.724)
GDP per capita
0.007
0.002
0.010
-0.018
-0.007
(0.009)
(0.010)
(0.009)
(0.013)
(0.011)
-2.789*** -2.590*** -1.885*** -2.768**
-3.665***
Intercept
(0.533)
(0.579)
(0.535)
(0.881)
(0.736)
Random Effects
Intercept
-0.593*** -0.460**
-0.620*** -0.436+
-0.446*
(0.162)
(0.158)
(0.176)
(0.248)
(0.211)
Wald chi-square
357.54*** 439.66*** 223.65*** 52.39*** 59.93***
statistics (df)
(12)
(12)
(12)
(12)
(12)
Likelihood ratio tests:
comparison to one-level
45.34*** 45.99*** 35.04*** 13.71*** 24.31***
model
Observations: 2,067 cases in individual level, 57 groups in city level
Note: Refer to Table 3 of the main text for notes of GDP per capita, fiscal revenue, social
security and employment expenditure, health expenditure, income, and other types of social
insurance. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p <
0.1.
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Table 5 Determinants of programme enrolments for employers, mixed-effects logistic
regression models, random effects clustered at city levels

Institutional Constraints
Rural hukou
(yes = 1)
Non-local hukou
(yes = 1)
Fiscal revenue of a city in 2011
Individual-level Controls
Income
Education
(years of schooling)
Age
Gender
(female = 1)
Formal sector experience
(yes = 1)
City-level Control in 2011
Social security and employment
expenditure
Health expenditure
GDP per capita
Intercept
Random Effects
Intercept

Pension
Programme
(1)

Health
Programme
(2)

Other Types of
Social Insurance
(3)

-1.191***
(0.272)
-0.776**
(0.299)
0.244*
(0.105)

-1.560***
(0.282)
-0.547+
(0.308)
0.301*
(0.136)

0.633
(0.500)
-1.647**
(0.557)
0.034
(0.140)

-0.021
(0.014)
0.102**
(0.039)
0.057***
(0.014)
0.541*
(0.235)
0.891***
(0.270)

-0.002
(0.014)
0.114**
(0.040)
0.043**
(0.014)
0.573*
(0.240)
0.643*
(0.285)

0.031
(0.020)
0.221**
(0.073)
0.006
(0.020)
-0.165
(0.379)
0.833*
(0.414)

-0.766
(0.564)
0.849
(0.852)
0.000
(0.012)
-4.761***
(0.994)

-0.230
(0.698)
0.281
(1.110)
-0.011
(0.016)
-3.462**
(1.073)

1.184
(0.780)
1.318
(1.044)
0.013
(0.016)
-7.590***
(1.680)

-0.780
(0.478)
100.77***
(11)

-0.091
(0.243)
94.26***
(11)

-0.568
(0.603)
43.28***
(11)

Wald chi-square
statistics (df)
Likelihood ratio tests:
1.92+
14.43***
1.17
comparison to one-level model
Observations: 531 cases in individual level, 54 groups in city level
Note: Refer to Table 3 of the main text for notes on GDP per capita, fiscal revenue, social
security and employment expenditure, health expenditure, income, and other types of social
insurance. Standard errors are in parentheses. *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05, + p <
0.1.
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